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Abstract — Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and biometric 
technologies saw fast evolutions during the last years and which 
are used in several applications, such as access control. Among 
important characteristics in the RFID tags, we mention the 
limitation of resources (memory, energy, …). Our work focuses 
on the design of a RFID authentication protocol which uses 
biometric data and which confirms the secrecy, the 
authentication and the privacy. Our protocol requires a PRNG 
(Pseud-Random Number Generator), a robust hash function and 
Biometric hash function. The Biometric hash function is used to 
optimize and to protect biometric data. For Security analysis of 
protocol proposed, we will use AVISPA and SPAN tools to verify 
the authentication and the secrecy. 
Keywords-component; RFID; authentication protocol; biométric; 
security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
At present, the problem of access control is very important 
in several applications. Physical access control consists in 
verifying if a person asking to reach a zone (e.g. building, 
office, parking, laboratory, etc.), has the right necessities to 
make it. The protocols of identity verification which allow 
access are called the authentication protocols. They answer the 
following two questions: "Who am I?" and "Am I really the 
person who is proceeding?". Answer to this first question is 
based on the recognition or the identification of the user which 
consists in associating an identity to a person, such as a 
smartcard or a RFID tag. Concerning the second question 
which articulates on the verification or the authentication of the 
user, it gives permission to a proclaimed identity. In other 
terms, it consists in identifying a user from one or several 
physiological characteristics (fingerprints, face, iris, etc.), or 
behavioural (signature, measure, etc.). These techniques are 
called Biometric Methods [14].  
Among techniques and systems of identification which 
were developed quickly during the last years, we can notice 
that Radiofrequency identification (RFID) that is used in 
different domains (health, supply chain, access control, etc.). 
The RFID systems consist of three entities: (1) the tag (or the 
label) is a small electronic device, supplemented with an 
antenna that can transmit and receive data, (2) the reader which 
communicates with the tag by radio waves and (3) the server 
(or database, back-end) which uses information obtained from 
the reader for useful purposes. The main characteristic of a 
RFID system is the limitation of resources (memory, the 
processor, the consumption of energy, etc. …); on the other 
hand, these systems are necessary to assure security in all the 
levels of the system. Major difference between a RFID tag and 
a contactless smartcard is the limitation of computer resources. 
In RFID systems, several authentication protocols have 
been developed [4,5,6,7]. Difference between these techniques 
lies in the realized properties of security and the complexity of 
implementation. Most of these protocols answer the first 
question only "Who am I? ". On the contrary systems with 
smartcards there are several authentication protocols based on 
the biometric technology, we mention here [8,9,10]. 
This paper, we propose an authentication protocol based on 
the combination between a RFID system and a biometric 
system. We verify secrecy, authentication of the tag and 
authentication of the reader by AVISPA&SPAN tools [1,2]. 
The conceived protocol protects the privacy of the user. To 
estimate these performances, we will compare it with the other 
RFID protocols and the biometric protocols of smart cards. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II presents 
related work. Section III presents the system and hypotheses. 
Section IV presents the proposed protocol. The section V 
presents a check of the protocol automatically. An analysis of 
privacy side is then presented. Section VI presents a 
comparison of performances with existing works. We end by a 
general conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In the protocols using identifier ID, two mechanisms are 
used: static and dynamic. The characteristic of the mechanism 
of static ID is that the identifier of the tag remains the same 
during the complete authentication, but that of the dynamic 
mechanism, the identifier of tag is modified. Every mechanism 
has his advantages and inconveniences. Here we present 
mainly the mechanism of static ID used in this article. 
In the RHLS protocol (Randomized Hash Lock scheme) 
[5], information passed on with the tag every time when it is 
interrogated consists of random value nt and value H1 = h(ID, 
nt). RHLS which discovers two types of attacks: replay attack 
and tracing attack. 
Concerning the protocol which is proposed with Chien and 
Huang (CH protocol) [4], the reader R and the tag T share 
secrets k and ID. Launch by the reader which sends a nonce nr. 
The tag produces an unpredictable nonce nt and calculates the 
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hash function g, such as g = h(nr Nt ID). This hash function 
and ID are used as parameters for the function rotate. The value 
of ID is returned; it depends on the value of g. The tag 
calculates the xor of the returned ID and g, before the sending 
of the left half of the results and nt to the reader. The reader 
calculates every pair of ID and k until it finds the 
corresponding tag. It sends then the right half of the xor of ID 
returned and g to the tag. CH protocol which discovers an 
attack of the type algebraic replay attacks, its cause is the false 
use of the algebraic operator xor in messages passed on by the 
function g. This attack is discovered also in LAK protocol [19]. 
Lee and al. [7] propose a protocol improved to avoid two 
types of attack: tracing and spoofing attack by use of various 
values of the hash function h during every authentication. 
These objectives are realized after analysis of this protocol. The 
cost of a hash function operation in tag is four, what is 
incompatible with the storage space and lower capacity to 
calculate. Therefore, excessive calculation will affect inevitably 
the efficiency of the protocol. 
Biometry is widely used in the authentication protocols of 
the smart cards applications [8, 9, and 10]. The use of these 
protocols in RFID systems will depend on the availability of 
computer resources (memory, complexity, performance …) in 
the constituents of RFID systems and especially the RFID tag. 
The recent protocol [10] requires the calculation of seven 
operations of the function h in the phases of login and 
authentication and requires 4l as storage space in the tag. This 
number of calculations and this storage space influences 
negatively on the efficiency of a RFID protocol. Another 
difficulty concerns “Matching” treatment. In the biometric 
authentication protocols, this part is made in the smart card 
with the technique Match-on-card.  
Concerning the material implementation of combined 
systems biometric-RFID, we shall quote two recent works. 
Rodrigues and al. [15] propose a decentralized authentication 
solution for embedded systems that combines both token-based 
and biometric-based mechanism authentication. Aboalsamh 
[16] propose a compact system that consists of a CMOS 
fingerprint sensor (FPC1011F1) is used with the FPC2020 
power efficient fingerprint processor; which acts as a biometric 
sub-system with a direct interface to the sensor as well as to an 
external flash memory for storing finger print templates. An 
RFID circuit is integrated with the sensor and fingerprint 
processor to create an electronic identification card (e-ID card). 
The e-ID card will pre-store the fingerprint of the authorized 
user. The RFID circuit is enabled to transmit data and allow 
access to the user, when the card is used and the fingerprint 
authentication is successful. 
III. SYSTEM AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  RFID-Biometric System 
A. System  modeling  
The proposed system of authentication is based on the 
combination of two sub-systems: a RFID system and a 
biometric system. RFID system consists of: a tag (T ), a reader 
(R ) and a server (S). Used biometric system consists of two 
entities, a sensor (SR) and a server (S), see the Figure 1. 
1) Biometric data 
Biometric data can be stored in the tag or in the data base. 
The biometric template will be stored in the tag. It offers a 
greater privacy and the mobility of the user. This assures also 
that information will always be with the user’s tag. Storing the 
raw biometric data typically requires substantially more 
memory. For example, a complete fingerprint image will 
require 50 to 100 Kbytes, while a fingerprint template requires 
only 300 bytes to 2 Kbytes [14]. This condition is not always 
sufficient especially for the type of passive RFID tags. In our 
system, a practicable solution to optimize and to protect 
biometric data is the hash function. This function of template 
allows pressing the biometric template in an acceptable size. 
The problem which lies with the hash functions standard 
(e.g. SHA-1, MD5, SHA-256, …) is comparison between two 
templates: the template which is protected in the tag a h(B) and 
the template which is generated from the capture h(B’). 
Equality h(B) = h(B') for the same person is not always assured, 
because B' is a dynamic template where the person never keeps 
the same biometric features, (e.g. movement of the finger 
during the purchase), which implies the existence of a rate of 
error. We will quote two research works:  
Sutcu and al. [12] propose a secure biometric based 
authentication scheme which fundamentally relies on the use of 
a robust hash function. The robust hash function is a one-way 
transformation tailored specifically for each user based on their 
biometrics. The function is designed as a sum of properly 
weighted and shifted Gaussian functions to ensure the security 
and privacy of biometric data. They also provide test results 
obtained by applying the proposed scheme to ORL face 
database by designating the biometrics as singular values of 
face images. 
A. Nagar and al. [13] propose six different measures to 
evaluate the security strength of template transformation 
schemes. Based on these measures, they analyze the security of 
two well-known template transformation techniques, namely, 
Biohashing and cancelable fingerprint templates based on the 
proposed metrics. 
2) Tag and Reader 
The tag stores the identity (ID) and the biometric hash 
function of the template of the person (GB). This ID is strictly 
confidential and is shared between the database of the back-
end server (S) and the tag (T). The tag can generate random 
numbers and calculation of the hash function h of a number. 
Standard ISO and EPC GEN2 (Electronic Product Code, 
Generation 2) support to produce the random numbers 
(nonces) in the tag. The reader R can generate also the random 
numbers.  
3) Server 
The server has two main functionalities:  
 
 
Sensor  
 
 
Tag Reader 
 
Server 
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 For the biometric system: extraction of the 
characteristics of a biometric modality to create a 
model or template (B), 
 Concerning RFID system: it contains the database 
which includes the list of the identity of tags (ID).  
4) Sensor 
A biometric sensor is an electronic device used to capture 
a biometric modality of a person (fingerprint, face, voice, etc.). 
B. Security and privacy requirements: 
Our protocol strives to achieve four requirements: 
secrecy, authentication of the tag, authentication of the reader 
and untraceability. 
 Secrecy: or confidentiality, the verification that the 
identity of the tag ID  is never passed on clearly to air 
on the interface radio frequency which can be spied. 
 Authentication of tag: A reader has to be capable of 
verifying a correct tag to authenticate and to identify a 
tag in complete safety. 
 Authentication of reader: A tag has to be capable of 
confirming that it communicates with the legitimate 
reader (a single reader exists in communications 
between the constituents of the RFID system). 
 Untraceability: We consider the notion of 
untraceability as defined in [17] which captures the 
intuitive notion that a tag is untraceable if an adversary 
cannot tell whether he has seen the same tag twice or 
two different tags. 
C. Intruder Model 
Besides modelling security protocols, it is also necessary to 
model the intruder, that is to say, to define its behaviour and 
limit. For this, the assumptions used are gathered under the 
name “Dolev-Yao model” [6]. This intruder model is based on 
two important assumptions that are the perfect encryption and 
the intruder is the network. 
Perfect encryption ensures in particular that an intruder can 
decrypt a message m encrypted with key k if it has the opposite 
of that key. The second hypothesis which is "the intruder is the 
network" means that, the intruder has complete control over the 
network and he can derive new messages from his initial 
knowledge and the messages received from honest principals 
during protocol runs. To derive a new message, the intruder can 
compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in 
case he knows the key. 
For the assumption “the intruder is the network”, the RFID 
network system in this case is wireless, it is based on 
communication by radio waves. Communication among the 
server and the reader and between the server and the sensor is 
secure. Contrary to this, communication between the tag and 
reader is not assured and based on radio frequencies waves. We 
assume that the adversary can observe, block, modify, and 
inject messages in any communication between a reader and a 
tag.  
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
The proposed Protocol is divided into two processes: the 
phase of registration and the phase of mutual authentication. 
We, afterward, use the following notations: 
T RFID tag or transponder 
R  RFID reader or transceiver  
S Back-end server  
Nt random number (nonce)  generated by tag T 
Nr  random number (nonce)  generated by reader R 
H() One-way  hach function  
G() BioHash (Biometric hash function ) 
║ Concatenation  of two inputs 
B Biometric template 
ID Identity of tag  
GB Biohashed value of B 
 Or-exclusif 
HR The right half of H  
HL The left half of H  
X≈Y mean X=Y±E  (E : rate of error) 
 
Steps detailed by two processes are described below.  
 
A. Registration Processus  
This initial phase called also registration. The objective is to 
create a template biometric and stored in related to a declared 
identity (see the figure 2.). In this phase, it has to execute the 
following steps to obtain the RFID tag. 
Step 1: the authorized user inputs his/ her personal 
biometrics, to pass it on to the server of the trusted registration 
center (RC). 
Step 2: the RC, after extraction of biometric characteristics, 
creates a biometric template B, and computes the biometric 
hash function GB such as GB = g (B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Registration Processus 
Step 3: Then, the registration center stores the information 
{ID, GB} in the user’s tag and sends it to the tag through a 
secure channel. 
 
                             RC                        T 
 
B. Mutual Authentication Processus 
According to the order of the passed on messages, the 
process of authentication takes place as follows  
(to see Figure 3): 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biometric 
Capture 
Extraction 
Creation of 
Template 
Protection of 
Template 
ID, GB 
 G
ID 
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Figure 3.  Proposed Protocol 
Step 1: Challenge  
The reader RFID produces a nonce Nr and sends it then, 
and a request to the tag. Three cases can occur: 1) No tag 
answers, 2) A tag answers, 3) Many tags answer at the same 
time. In our protocol, the last case is not approved because one 
requires the capture of only one biometry for every person and 
for every tag in every process of authentication.  
Step 2: Authentication of the tag 
Step 2.1: the tag found in the step 1 generates a nonce Nt and 
computes P = HG(IDNt║Nr) 
Step 2.2: the tag sends P with the nonce Nt to the reader 
RFID, 
Step 2.3: the reader resends the successful P message, Nt and 
the nonce Nr to the server. 
Step 2.4: from the database, the server looks for certain IDi 
(such as 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n the number of tags) to compute Pi=HG 
(IDiNt║Nr), and make the following comparison: 
Pi ?= P 
If it is found, the tag crosses the authentication of the tag 
and is considered as legitimate, otherwise to end. 
Step 3: Authentication of the server 
Step 3.1: the server computes and sends to the reader Q; 
 Q = HD(IDiNt║Nr) such as IDi = ID 
Step 3.2: the reader sends the Q message in the tag. 
Step 3.3: the tag computes HD(IDNt║Nr) and verifies if:  
 Q ?= HD(IDNt║Nr) 
 
If they are equal, the authentication of the reader is 
successful; otherwise the authentication of the reader has 
failed. 
Step 4: Verification of biometry  
Step 4.1: the tag computes M1 = h (ID║Nt║Nr) and 
makes operation or-exclusive of M1 with GB and Nt. The 
resultant message is M = M2GBNt. 
Step 4.2: the tag sends M to the reader RFID, and the reader 
resends received message to the server. 
Step 4.3: after acquiring of the biometry of the user from the 
sensor, it sends it to the server. The server extracts biometric 
characteristics and generates the template B. the server 
computes the biometric hash function of the template g(B). 
Step 4.4: from the database, the server computes M2=h 
(IDi║Nt║Nr)Nt, such as IDi= ID (of the step 2.4), and 
extracts GB from:  
 M2  GB = M 
Step 4.5: to make the comparison of type 1:1 of g(B) ≈ GB, if 
it is confirmed, the person is a trusted user, otherwise, the 
bearer of the tag is illegitimate, the information of failure will 
be sent to the reader, the protocol is interrupted. 
V. SECURITY VERIFICATION OF PROTOCOL 
A. Automatic Verification 
There are several tools of automatic verification of 
protocols. We chose tools AVISPA (Automated Validation of 
internet Security Protocols and Applications) [1] and SPAN 
(Security Protocol ANimator) [2] for the following reasons: 
four tools are available using various techniques of validation 
(Model-checking, automate trees, resolution of constraints, 
Solver SAT). These tools are based on the same language of 
specification: language HLPSL (High-Level Protocol 
Specification Language) [18]. The platform AVISPA is the 
analyzer which models a big number of protocols (more than 
84 protocols). Among these four tools, two tools OFMC and 
CL-ATSE which can verify protocols requiring the operator or-
exclusive (xor). Concerning our protocol, we verify the 
properties of the confidentiality of the identity ID (sec_id_TR 
and sec_id_RT respectively), the confidentiality of the template 
B ( sec_b ), the authentication of the tag (aut_tag) and the 
authentication of the reader ( aut_reader). These properties are 
specified in HLPSL as follows: 
goal 
    secrecy_of sec_b, sec_id_TR, sec_id_RT 
    authentication_on aut_reader 
    authentication_on aut_tag 
end goal 
 
Concerning the authentication, there are two possible 
attacks: the replay attack and the attack Man-in-the-Middle. 
For it, we uses two types of specification in the role HLPSL's 
environment.  
1) Replay Attack 
In the replay attack, the intruder can listen to the message of 
answer of the tag and to the reader. It will broadcast the 
message listened without modification to the reader later. 
Specification below of the role environment in HLPSL 
depends on the treatment of two identical sessions between the 
same tag and the same reader (t and r). This scenario allows 
discovering the attacks of the type replay attack if it exists.  
 
Q 
P,Nt,Nr 
S 
Input  B 
Verify g(B) ≈GB 
Q= HD(IDNt║Nr) 
Pi=HG(IDiNt║Nr) 
Verify Pi = P 
 
nonce Nt 
P= HG(IDNt║Nr) 
T 
nonce Nr 
R 
Request, Nr 
Q 
P,Nt 
ID ID,GB 
M1=h(ID║Nt║Nr) 
M= M1GBNt 
M 
M 
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role environment() def= 
const t,r : agent, 
      id,b : text, 
      h,g,left,right : hash_func 
intruder_knowledge = {t,r,h,g,hright,hleft} 
composition 
session(t,r,id,b,h,g,hright,hleft) /\ 
session(t,r,id,b,h,g,hright,hleft) 
end role  
 
After the verification of this protocol by AVISPA tools, 
result is as follows: 
SUMMARY 
  SAFE 
DETAILS 
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
  UNTYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
  C:\progra~1\SPAN\testsuite\results\BioMRFID.if 
GOAL 
  As Specified 
BACKEND 
  CL-AtSe 
STATISTICS 
  Analysed   : 600 states 
  Reachable  : 188 states 
  Translation: 0.01 seconds 
  Computation: 0.02 seconds 
   
This result means in clearly that there is no replay attack. 
We can thus deduct that the diagnosis of AVISPA&SPAN 
tools for this protocol is secure. 
2) Main-in-the-midlle Attack  
The scenario of the role environment below allows 
discovering the attacks of this type if it exists.  
role environment() def= 
const t,r : agent, 
      id,b,idti,idri,bti,bri : text, 
      h,g,hright,hleft : hash_func 
intruder_knowledge = {t,r,h,g, 
hright,hleft,idti,idri,bti,bri} 
composition 
     session(t,r,id,b,h,g,hright,hleft)  
 /\  session(t,i,idti,bti,h,g,hright,hleft)   
 /\  session(i,r,idri,bri,h,g,hright,hleft) 
end role 
 
The result of the check with this scenario is the same as 
with the scenario a). We can thus deduct that this protocol is 
resistant in the attack of the “man in the middle”. 
B. Security Analysis  
We now analyze the security properties of the proposed 
protocol as follows: untraceability, desynchronization 
resistance and with Denial of service (DOS) attack prevention. 
1) Untraceability :  
During every session of authentication, an opponent can 
observe only the values of (Nt, Nr, M1, P, Q), where, Nt and 
Nr are random numbers and M1 and Q messages are calculated 
the right/ left part of the function H(IDNt║Nr). The P 
message = H(ID║Nt║Nr)GBNt. The opponent cannot 
deduce the value of ID because function H(ID║Nt║Nr) is 
very effective as is shown in the paper of [11]. In M1 
messages, P and Q, the opponent cannot correlate ID and B 
because these two values are secret and Nt and Nr are random 
numbers changed in every authentication. So, an opponent 
cannot track tags. 
2) Desynchronization Resistance :  
Our protocol belongs to the static mechanism ID where the 
identifier of the tag is fixed. So, in the case of the loss of 
message, failing of energy or the loss of connection with the 
server during the authentication, it will not affect the database 
of the server and will not become an obstacle to the protocol. 
3) DOS attack Prevention: 
There are several categories of Dos attacks, one is to 
desynchronize the internal states of two entities, and the other 
is to exhaust the resources of the parties involved. 
For RFID authentication protocols, researchers are concerned 
about desynchronization.  
For our protocol, the internal state ID is kept static and not 
changed during authentication process. So, it can resist the 
attack of denial of service. 
In the Table I below, a comparison of the security with 
protocols mentioned early is given [4, 5, 6, and 7]. 
TABLE I : ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
RFID Protocol 
(static ID) 
RLHS 
[5] 
LCAP 
[6] 
CH 
[4] 
LHYC 
[7] 
Our 
Protocol 
Mutual Authentification  + + + + + 
Replay attack prevention  - + - + + 
Non traceability  - + + + + 
DoS attack prevention - - + + + 
Desynchronization Resistance   + + + + + 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS   
As compared with what follows in Table II. This table 
illustrates the storage cost, the communication cost, and the 
computation cost of entities. The computation cost is a function 
of the number of operations of the hash function in phase’s 
login and the authentication on the smartcard for the biometric 
protocols, as well as of the number of operations of the hash 
function on the tag in RFID protocols. 
Computation Cost: the tag used in the protocol proposed by 
Lee and al. (Protocol LHYC) [7] and the smart cards of the 
biometric protocols require an important number of operations 
for the hash function. On the contrary, in the protocol of Chien 
and Huang [4], it requires a random numbers generator with an 
input number, but it is necessary not to forget the replay 
algebraic attack.  
In our protocol, we require two operations of calculation of 
function h in the tag, so these calculations are effective for 
RFID tags. 
Communication Cost: Communication cost between a tag 
and a reader consists of: the number of message exchanges, and 
the total bit size of the transmitted messages, per each 
communication. Concerning our protocol, the total of the bits 
of the messages of communication tag to the reader is: 2½l and 
for the message of communication reader to tag is: ½l. With 
regard to the other protocols of smart cards the performance of 
the communication of our protocol is more effective. 
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TABLE II : PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
 
Protocol 
Computation 
Cost  
Tag/Card 
Storage 
Cost  
Communication Cost  
R T T R ∑ 
R
F
ID
 
[4] 1g 2l ½l 1½l 2l 
[5] 1h 1l - 2l 2l 
[6] 2h 1l 1l 2l 3l 
[7] 4h 2l 1l 2l 3l 
S
m
ar
t
C
ar
d
 [8] 4h 3l 2l 3l 5l 
[9] 4h 3l 2l 3l 5l 
[10] 3h 4l 2l 3l 5l 
Our protocol 2h 2l ½l 2½l  3l 
          Notations: h - the cost of a hash function operation,  
               g - random number generator with an input number, 
               l: size of required memory. 
 
Storage Cost: The amount of storage needed on the back-
end server is also another important issue. In the biometric 
protocols [8, 9], the smart card requires 3l bit and 4l for the 
protocol [10]. In our protocol, the tag requires 2l bit to store the 
identity (ID) and the function h of template (GB). 
Consequently, in the implemented protocols, the tag requires 
only 2l bits at most of the memory, which is adapted to tags 
with weak cost. 
We can conclude that our protocol is effective and adapted 
to RFID tags as far as the computation cost; the storage cost 
and the communication cost are concerned. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We proposed in this article a new RFID authentication 
protocol which uses biometric data. Our protocol is compatible 
with the constrained computational and memory resources of 
the RFID tags. Concerning the problem of the size of biometric 
data, we applied the hash function to the biometric template, 
which allows to optimize and to protect these data. Our 
protocol realizes the secrecy private data, the authentication of 
the tag and the authentication of the reader. Experimental tests 
(with AVISPA and SPAN tools) proved it. We made an 
analysis of security on the efficiency of our protocol for 
untraceability, resistance for the denial of service (DOS) attack 
prevention and the desynchronization resistance.  
The advantage of our protocol is that it can be used in 
decentralized applications since we have no need of biometric 
database of the users in the system.  
Future research includes additional work in regards to the 
biometric hash function. There are many researches on the 
implementation of the robust hash function in RFID tags. But 
researches on the implementation of Biometric hash function 
are limited.  
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